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Abstract
Objectives: To determine if and in what ways serious patient safety incidents differ from
non-serious patient safety incidents.
Methods: Statistical analysis was performed on patient safety incident reports that were
reported in 2015 in Finland’s largest hospital district (Helsinki and Uusimaa, HUS).
Reports were divided into two groups: non-serious incidents and serious incidents.
Differences between groups were studied from several types of categorically divided
information.
Results: Of the total amount of reports (15 863) 1 % were serious incidents (175). Serious
and non-serious incidents differed significantly from each other. Serious incidents
concerning laboratory, imaging or medical equipment were more common. On the other
hand incidents concerning medication, infusion, blood transfusion, were less frequent. In
serious incidents the proportion of doctors reporting was greater and contributing factors
were better recognized, the most common of them being working of procedures.
Conclusions: In the future, special attention should be given to the particular aspects of
serious patient safety incidents, such as safe use of medical equipment, training and
handling of procedures. Root cause analysis is an effective way to handle serious incidents
and enables the prevention of their reoccurrence. However, a systematic follow of the root
cause analysis should be developed.
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1 Introduction
Scientific research on patient safety began in the 1980s, especially in the United States (1).
In Finland, research on this subject began vigorously only in the early 2000s. In 2009, the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health in Finland announced for the first time a national
patient safety strategy and in 2011 a plan for quality management and for ensuring patient
safety was published and implemented in Finnish legislation (2, 3). Also currently training
programs for health care professionals on patient safety (4) and a nationwide reporting
system for incidents and near miss events have been implemented in the health care system.
A patient safety incident (safety incident) is an adverse event compromising patient safety
that could have or did lead to patient harm. Most of these are non-serious patient safety
incidents (non-serious incident). However, serious patient safety incidents (serious incident)
are also reported. A serious incident is an event that leads to substantial, serious or permanent
harm to patient, causes serious danger to the life or safety of the patient, or is a patient safety
incident concerning a large group of patients. Serious harm is a consequence from an event
that leads to a patient’s death, commencement or continuation of hospitalization, serious
impairment, disability or an event that is life-threatening (5, 6). Serious incidents form a
small but significant fraction of safety incidents and it is important to study their nature and
prevalence.
The aspects of human error, especially from the view of human factors, are widely covered
by Reason (7). He divides human action into routine processes, more unfamiliar situations
and novel situations. In each situation certain type of errors are expected: slips and lapses;
rule-based mistakes; and knowledge based mistakes respectively.
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The current scientific view on human error emphasizes the system approach, according to
which working environments and organizational processes are such that errors are expected
(8, 9, 10). In addition, working procedures at all levels of the organization drift towards
procedures that are more likely to cause errors (9, 10). Therefore, organizations must have
processes through which procedures are monitored, incidents are reacted to and lessons are
learned from them and finally, future events are anticipated (9).
Improving patient safety is essential from both humane and economical perspectives. In
Finland, the Finnish Patient Insurance Centre handles all personal injuries that occur in
connection with healthcare activities. It compensates annually about 2200 patient injuries
and their costs are about 41 million euros (11). Much of the costs of medical errors are,
however, covered either by health care units in their extra costs or by patients themselves
due to prolonged disabilities and suffering.
2 Methods
The purpose of this study was to determine if and in what ways serious incidents differ from
non-serious incidents. An additional objective was to identify the nature and number of both
types of incidents.
All Finnish hospital districts, together more than 144 000 health care professionals, use a
common system for reporting patient safety incidents (HaiPro). HaiPro reporting program
has been developed by Awanic® and has been used since 2009. Finland is divided into 19
hospital districts. Helsinki and Uusimaa District (HUS) is the largest hospital district in
Finland and is further divided into five regionally determined hospital areas. HUS also runs
the largest academic teaching hospital in Finland (Helsinki University Hospital), which
covers all medical specialties in tertiary care and emergency services within the district. The
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number of patient safety reports continues to rise annually. Data consisted of HaiPro reports
generated in the HUS district in 2015. (4)
Patient safety at HUS is promoted through the principles of risk assessment. Risk assessment
is the process through which organizations develop an understanding of the risks they face
(12). The Patient Safety Development Program at HUS is coordinated by the Chief of Patient
Safety and e.g., the patient safety surveillance is guided by the steering committee which
monitors patient safety data on a regular basis.
2.1 HaiPro reporting system
The HaiPro reporting form is an easy-to-fill, e-form and can be accessed from the HUS
intranet homepage by anyone who works for HUS. It can be done anonymously and
employees are strongly encouraged to report incidents. The HaiPro system is not yet
available for patients (4). A separate procedure for reporting and analyzing severe patient
safety incidents has been in use since 2013. In the electronic HaiPro form, several types of
categorically divided information are selectable from dropdown menus. In this study, the
HaiPro categories are italicized. The administrative unit of the incident and of the employee,
occupation, time of incident, place of incident, nature of incident (actual or near miss) and
finally type of incident are selected. In addition, what happened, the consequences of the
incident, contributing factors and what could be done to avoid similar incidents in the future
are recorded. After submission, the report is automatically forwarded for analysis by a
doctor-nurse pair that is responsible for patient safety in the given unit.
Analysis begins by specifying and by changing the type of incident, which can be specified
from fifteen categories and several subcategories. Additional information can be requested
from the person who filed the report. The degree of harm is specified and the consequences
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for the unit are selected. Next, the level of risk is determined by assessing the likelihood of
reoccurrence and the severity of the consequences using the HaiPro risk matrix (Figure 1).
Control of the situation and immediate actions are also specified. The possible contributing
factors are specified (ten categories, several subcategories). Finally, the preventive action is
specified (four categories, several subcategories). The handling of a safety incident report is
illustrated in Figure 2.
The analysis of serious incidents differs from the procedure depicted earlier. A separate root
cause analysis (RCA) is coordinated by a serious incident analyst. If the degree of harm is
specified as serious or the incident has a risk level of IV or V, the report is automatically
directed to the serious incident analyst who then confirms the serious incident procedure or
returns the report to the regular safety incident analysis with explanation for the return. If
needed and if contact information is available, the serious incident analyst can request for
additional information from the person who filed the report. All serious incidents are
transferred to a higher level of organization and discussed in a multi-professional group led
by the serious incident coordinator. The chain of events is analyzed using the Ishikawa
procedure (13). With this method, particular causes that lead to the effect are identified. For
each effect, the actions promoting patient safety and the persons responsible for the actions
are defined and a deadline is given. After the RCA, the person marked as responsible for the
actions required receives an email about the task. The serious incident report is marked as
completed after all the necessary actions are performed.
2.2 Data and Statistical Methods
HaiPro reports were divided into two groups: non-serious incidents and serious incidents.
Groups were created 2016/3/3. To determine how non-serious incidents and serious
incidents differed in their nature, the number of reports in each category (e.g. type of
9
incident: medical equipment or its operation) was compared between the groups using a Chi-
squared test. The results from the main categories are the focus of this study. A cut-off p
value of 0.05 was used to evaluate statistical significance. If the number of reports was too
small to perform the test reliably, they were excluded (N/A, not available)
3 Results
3.1 HaiPro reports in HUS district
In the year 2015 there were in total 15 863 HaiPro reports made in the HUS district. Of these,
15 688 were non-serious incidents and 175 (1 %) were serious incidents.
In Hospital area 1 (including university hospital), the number of non-serious incidents was
10 406 and serious incidents 100. The range of serious incident percentages between
Hospital area 1 units was 0.2 % to 3.8 %. The range of percentages between Hospital areas
was 0.7 % to 2.4 %. The greatest percentage of serious incidents in Hospital area 1 (n = 38,
3.8 %) was reported in the unit including operating rooms, intensive care and pain
management. (Table 1.)
3.2 Non-serious incidents, serious incidents and their differences
According to this study, there are statistically significant differences in the nature between
serious and non-serious incidents. It is noteworthy, that serious incidents were more
commonly concerned with laboratory tests and medical equipment and that the most
common contributing factor was handling of procedures.
The greatest proportion of the serious incidents happened in patient rooms (non-serious 4284
[27 %], serious 60 [34 %], p < 0.05) and operating rooms (non-serious 801 [5 %], serious
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26 [15 %], p < 0.05). In laboratory the proportion of incidents between groups was equal
(non-serious 1638 [10 %], serious 16 [9 %], p > 0.05). Regarding weekdays, there were no
differences between groups. In both groups, errors in working days were more common than
in Saturdays and Sundays. (data not shown)
Doctors filed a greater proportion of serious incidents (non-serious 763 [5 %], serious 28 [16
%], p < 0.05). However, in both groups nurses filed the reports most often (non-serious
11 388 [73 %], serious 107 [61 %], p < 0.05). Incidents that actually happened were reported
more often in serious incidents (non-serious 9037 [58 %], serious 139 [79 %], p < 0.05).
Near miss reporting was more common among nurses and other personnel. In serious
incidents the degree of harm was most commonly serious (33 %) (data not shown).
The summary of incident types is shown in Table 2. The most common serious incidents
were Laboratory, imaging or other tests (non-serious 2754 [18 %], serious 41 [23 %], p <
0.05) followed by other treatment or monitoring (non-serious 1282 [8 %], serious 26 [15
%], p < 0.05) and medical equipment or its operation (non-serious 880 [6 %], serious 23 [13
%], p < 0.05). The most common non-serious incident was Medication, infusion, blood
transfusion, contrast medium (non-serious 5900 [38 %], serious 25 [14 %], p < 0.05). It was
the fourth most common among serious incidents.
As for the specific type of incident within serious incidents the most important were: sample
taken from the wrong patient (Laboratory, imaging or other tests), monitoring neglected or
the need for it not recognized (other treatment or monitoring) and equipment malfunction
(medical equipment or its operation) (data not shown).
A greater proportion of the consequences for the unit in serious incidents were extra work,
minor extra treatment (non-serious 8084 [52 %], serious 118 [67 %], p < 0.05) and harm to
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unit image (non-serious 4339 [28 %], serious 73 [42 %], p < 0.05). In addition, in serious
incidents, a clear difference was seen in longer stay of care (non-serious 609 [4 %], serious
49 [28 %], p < 0.05) and extra costs (non-serious 684 [4 %], serious 32 [18 %], p < 0.05).
A summary for contributing factors is shown in Table 3. In serious incidents, not known
presented a smaller proportion (non-serious 4001 [26 %], serious 15 [9 %], p < 0.05). On the
other hand, the most common contributing factor in serious incidents was handling of
procedures (non-serious 2985 [19 %], serious 62 [35 %], p < 0.05). Also more common in
serious incidents were training, orientation and skills (non-serious 1212 [8 %], serious 27
[15 %], p < 0.05) followed by medical device and equipment (non-serious 601 [4 %], serious
23 [13 %], p < 0.05).
Proposals for preventive actions differed in each category between groups. Common serious
incidents included decision to a higher organizational level (non-serious 380 [2 %], serious
42 [24 %], p < 0.05), no actions needed (non-serious 1938 [12 %], serious 38 [22 %], p <
0.05) and plan a procedure to prevent future incidents (non-serious 640 [4 %], serious 30
[17 %], p < 0.05). The proportion of inform/discuss about the incident (non-serious 12 298
[78 %], serious 72 [41 %], p < 0.05) was significantly smaller in serious incidents but was
the greatest category in both groups.
4 Discussion
To our knowledge, there are no previous studies in the English literature that focus on the
differences between non-serious and serious incidents. Thus, this study brings new and more
specific scientific evidence on the nature of patient safety incidents.
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Ruuhilehto et.al. analyzed all safety incidents made with the HaiPro system in Finland from
2007-2009 (14). Regarding non-serious incidents, findings are consistent with our study.
However at that time separate RCA for serious incidents was not in use.
The National Health Service England (NHS) publishes quarterly reports from the National
Reporting and Learning System (NRLS). Data is available from all safety incidents. Serious
incidents are directed to a separate serious incident management process and public data
containing only serious incidents is not available. In 2014, the most common type of incident
in the NRLS data was patient accident (19 %). When analyzing the combined number of
incidents with degree of harm serious harm and death, the most common type of incident
was implementation of care and ongoing monitoring / review (19 %) (15). This is in
accordance with our study where other treatment or monitoring was more common in
serious incidents.
In Finland, health care professionals receive training for the use of HaiPro. Use of incident
reporting systems as such improves patient safety. Furthermore, the training received by
health care professionals increases their knowledge about safety culture, which in turn also
improves patient safety (16, 17, 18). Especially with regards to this study, the level of
organizational safety culture may also impact the degree of safety incident seriousness (19).
In general, health care organizations should specifically work to create a nonpunitive safety
culture in order to improve patient safety (20). The number of incident reports in Finland has
risen annually, which is indicative of improving patient safety culture and increasing patient
safety in general.
According to our study, about 1 % of all safety incidents in HUS are serious, which is in
accordance with other studies (14, 15, 16). However, only about 2 % of patients are involved
in a safety incident, when compared to the total number of treated different patients. This
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finding does not correspond to other studies, according to which approximately 10 % of
patients are involved in a safety incident (21). This discrepancy may be a sign of
underreporting. There are no previous studies in Finland that consider how many of the
incidents actually get reported. According to some studies, approximately 20 % of the
employees admit omitting a non-serious incident report and about 4 % admit that they have
not filed a report after a serious incident (22, 23). Incident reporting willingness in Finland
should be further studied.
In both groups, nurses had submitted the majority of reports, which is consistent with
previous studies (22, 24, 25). However, the portion of reports submitted by doctors was three
times higher in serious incidents. It seems that the employees’ willingness to report incidents
increases with severity of incidents (22), but to our knowledge there are no studies that try
to resolve the differences regarding doctors’ willingness to report serious versus non-serious
incidents. According to other studies, doctors’ willingness to report safety incidents in
general is reduced, for example, by insufficient training on patient safety, fear of blame,
embarrassment, fear of consequences for their future career or the belief that it is not their
responsibility to report others’ mistakes (22, 24, 25). On the contrary, willingness to report
increases if the reporting provides a possibility to learn from mistakes (26), feedback is given
and reports are kept confidential (27). The increased amount of serious incident reports by
doctors may in part arise from the fact that doctors perform more risky procedures and that
doctors are legally responsible for patient care (3). In conclusion, it seems that doctors´
activity increases when incidents are serious. The RCA Tool developed by the hospital
district facilitates a structured process for an analysis of serious cases. This further promotes
willingness to report serious incidents, especially when they are handled nonpunitively. This
phenomenon is suggested for future research.
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The number of reports in both groups was twice as large on working days compared to
reporting on weekends. This is explained at least in part with the corresponding allocation
of elective operations on weekdays. In addition, weekday was the only type of data where
there were no statistically significant differences between groups.
Harm to unit image was almost twice as common of a consequence for the unit in serious
incidents compared to non-serious incidents. This finding may in part reflect undeveloped
patient safety culture and employees’ beliefs that a serious incident is shameful. If this is the
case, employees in a way have not accepted the fact that mistakes can happen anytime and
to anyone (7, 8, 9 and 10). Additionally, longer stay of care and extra costs were more
common consequences for the unit in serious incidents. According to this study, serious
incidents are critical for the institution from the economical perspective. Further, in serious
incidents the degree of harm was usually serious. Therefore serious incidents are critical also
for the patient from humane perspective. Targeted patient safety training directed decreasing
the serious incidents can not only reduce human suffering but also reduce total costs (16, 17,
18).
Other studies, as well as ours, have found medication-related incidents to be most common
(15, 28). However, in our study among serious incidents medication-related incidents were
only the fourth most common type, while laboratory, imaging or other tests was the most
common type of incident. In the NRLS data, “degree of harm by type” categories of severe
and death can be combined as one category and then be compared with serious incidents in
our study (15). In that case the proportion of medication in the NRLS data also decreased,
which is in accordance with our study. In the NRLS data, medical device / equipment is a
fairly rare category in general. This is inconsistent with our study, where medical equipment
or its operation-related incidents were common (5,6 % of non-serious), especially in the
serious incidents (13,1 %). Further studies are necessary to determine the effectiveness of
15
training, safe use of medical equipment and their maintenance since in this study
contributing factors such as handling of procedures and training, orientation and skills and
medical device and equipment were also more common in the serious incidents.
In the non-serious incidents, contributing factors were not known in one-fourth of the
incidents, three times more than in serious incidents. It seems that in serious incidents
contributing factors are recognized more effectively. Preventive actions were also more
commonly reported. Plan a procedure to prevent future incidents or decision to a higher
organizational level were more common in serious incidents. Therefore, the RCA where
effects are identified and the actions for promoting patient safety are specified seems to be
an appropriate way to handle serious patient safety incidents.
In order to achieve effective and sustainable solutions following a RCA health care
organizations should consider for example institutional changes and updates in IT structures.
However many smaller solutions together, such as training and counselling can also have an
effective and sustainable impact on patient safety. (29)
In our study actions to be done usually included discussions with the persons involved,
reminders to the personnel about applicable guidelines or processing the cases in unit
meetings. Procedures were also updated and new guidelines created. Additionally, extra
training was provided for the personnel or new equipment were purchased. Further studies
are necessary to determine if the performed actions have an impact on patient safety. It is
noteworthy, that in the HaiPro system the completion of the actions promoting patient safety
are not automatically monitored. A system that follows the progression of actions promoting
patient safety is required.
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To summarize the findings regarding RCA, our study seems to be in accordance with the
current scientific view on the matter; the method is promising but is rarely used to its full
potential. In our study the most notable weakness of RCA was the lack of measuring of
outcomes. There are also other widely recognized problems with RCA. For example analysis
often results in a linear chain of events (who, what) rather than a more realistic systemic
view (how) and the causes are expressed too vaguely. Secondly, the group performing RCA
is usually a local team rather than a diverse group of expert accident investigators with a
range of knowledge from subject matter to human factors and interview techniques. The
results of the analysis are also rarely shared with the persons involved, persons that might
come across with a similar situation, or with other units and organizations. The purpose of
sharing the results, in fact the purpose of the whole RCA method, is to learn from the events
and to prevent them from happening again. (30, 31, 32)
One possible solution for the shortcomings of RCA could be the use of the Human Factors
Analysis Classification System specifically tailored to the health care industry (32). This
method would allow for a standardized approach to identify “why” instead of “who and
what”. Human and environmental factors would be more thoroughly investigated and a
standardized nomenclature would provide the basis for sharing information across
organizations.
There are some limitations in this study which are suggested to be taken into consideration.
The main limitation is the type of HaiPro data which doesn´t represent the actual rate of
incidents. However, this study does not seek to describe an incident rate but rather a
descriptive analysis of the phenomenon which has seldomly been studied.
5 Conclusion
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In conclusion, the HaiPro reporting system is increasingly adopted in the Finnish health care
system. The systematic incident reporting procedure has been in use for a fairly short time
in Finland and the number of reports continues to rise annually. The increasing number of
patient safety reports is a sign of improved patient safety culture, which in turn is critical for
further improving patient safety. It is likely that not all incidents are reported, so additional
effort is necessary to further raise reporting willingness. Doctors’ increased activity to report
serious incidents should be further studied. In the future, special attention should be given
to the particular aspects of serious patient safety incidents, such as safe use of equipment,
training and procedures. A system that follows the progression of the actions for promoting
patient safety should be developed.
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Table 1. HaiPro reports in HUS Hospital areas (including Hospital area 1 units separately).
Table presents the numbers of safety incidents, non-serious incidents, serious incidents and the
percentage of serious incidents in relation to all safety incidents (%). Information is given from
each Hospital area.
Hospital area 1 safety incident non-serious serious %
children’s and juvenile diseases 1575 1570 5 0.3 %
psychiatry 1147 1132 15 1.3 %
acute 1027 1022 5 0.5 %
head and neck 1008 1004 4 0.4 %
operating rooms, intensive care, pain management 990 952 38 3.8 %
oncology 878 876 2 0.2 %
abdominal 826 822 4 0.5 %
heart and lung 791 782 9 1.1 %
gynecology and labor 643 631 12 1.9 %
rheumatic diseases and plastic surgery 619 617 2 0.3 %
internal medicine and rehabilitation 561 558 3 0.5 %
inflammation 441 440 1 0.2 %
Hospital area 1, total 10506 10406 100 1.0 %
Hospital area 2 1158 1143 15 1.3 %
Hospital area 3 926 919 7 0.8 %
Hospital area 4 536 532 4 0.7 %
Hospital area 5 248 242 6 2.4 %
HUSLAB 2043 2000 43 2.1 %
HUS imagining 277 277 0 0.0 %
Other (e.g. administrative, catering, maintenance) 169 169 0 0.0 %
HUS, total 15 863 15 688 175 1.1 %
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Table 2. Type of incident
Table presents the division of reports among type of incident for non-serious and serious incidents.
To ease interpretation, bolded numbers are used for the groups where the percentage of incidents
is greater and the difference is statistically significant. (n = number, % = percentage of reports
compared to group total)
Type of incident non-serious serious p value
n % n %
Medication, infusion, blood transfusion, contrast medium 5900 37,6 25 14,3 < 0.001
Information transfer and handling, communication 3659 23,3 31 17,7 0.081
Laboratory, imaging or other tests 2754 17,6 41 23,4 0.043
Other treatment or monitoring 1282 8,2 26 14,9 0.001
Medical equipment or its operation 880 5,6 23 13,1 < 0.001
Accident 696 4,4 15 8,6 0.009
Other 637 4,1 12 6,9 0.063
Violence 311 2,0 11 6,3 < 0.001
Asepsis/hygiene 264 1,7 1 0,6 N/A
Physical surroundings 233 1,5 3 1,7 N/A
Invasive procedure 214 1,4 10 5,7 < 0.001
Surgical operation 174 1,1 6 3,4 N/A
Diagnosis 101 0,6 4 2,3 N/A
Radiotherapy 74 0,5 0 0,0 N/A
Not known 32 0,2 0 0,0 N/A
First aid environment 16 0,1 0 0,0 N/A
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Table 3. Contributing factors
Table presents the division of reports among contributing factors for non-serious and serious
incidents. To ease interpretation, bolded numbers are used for the groups where the percentage of
incidents is greater and the difference is statistically significant. (n = number, % = percentage of
reports compared to group total)
Contributing factors non-serious serious p value
n % n %
Not known 4001 25,5 15 8,6 < 0.001
Handling of procedures 2985 19,0 62 35,4 < 0.001
Communication and information transfer 2772 17,7 28 16,0 0.564
No contributing factors, normal situation 2181 13,9 23 13,1 0.773
Environment, facilities, resources 1777 11,3 19 10,9 0.845
Training, orientation and skills 1212 7,7 27 15,4 < 0.001
Patient and relatives 665 4,2 17 9,7 < 0.001
Medical device and equipment 601 3,8 23 13,1 < 0.001
Teamwork 489 3,1 18 10,3 < 0.001
Organization, management 121 0,8 12 6,9 < 0.001
Medication 81 0,5 3 1,7 N/A
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Figure 1.
Risk Matrix Used with HaiPro Analysis
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Figure 2.
Handling of a Safety Incident Report in the HaiPro System
